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THE JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: FREE TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
EMILY HARWOOD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years, concern for, discussion of, and interest in
the environment has greatly increased.' Traditionally, environmental policy
has been conducted on the domestic level.2 Today, environmental policy is
as likely to be made on the international level as on the domestic level.3 The
first environmental agreements were agreements regarding how to deal with
particular environmental problems. Now that environmental awareness has
reached new heights, environmental provisions are being included in trade
agreements as well.4 The inclusion of environmental provisions in free trade
agreements raises several concerns regarding national sovereignty,
effectiveness, and accountability.5 Tensions between the goals of trade
liberalization and environmental protection have existed for at least a
century, but the conflict has only recently moved to the forefront of national
issues in the United States.6
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
passed and President Bush signed implementing legislation for the United
* Emily Harwood is a 2003 J.D. candidate attending the College of William and Mary School
of Law. Ms. Harwood received a B.S. from Colorado State University in 2000.
Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental
Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555 (1999).
2 Prasad Sharma, Comment, Restoring Participatory Democracy: Why the United States
Should Listen to Citizen Voices While Engaging in International Environmental Lawmaking,
12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1215, 1217 (1998).
3 Id. at 1215.
' See e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.A., 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
5 See Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental
Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International Law, and Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 427 (2001); Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, "To Dream the Impossible Dream": Globalization
and Harmonization of Environmental Laws, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205 (1995)
(discussing the conflict between free trade and protection of the environment); Sharma, supra
note 2, at 1233-41 (2001).
6 Michael Robins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of Free
Trade and the Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 123, 140-41 (1993).
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States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement ("JFTA").7 Originally negotiated by
President Clinton's trade team in October of 2000, it is the first free trade
agreement between the United States and an Arab nation. It practically
eliminates all tariffs and other trade restrictions between the two countries. 8
The agreement is significant as it is the first United States trade agreement
to contain "binding commitments, enforceable by sanctions, to adhere to
environmental and workplace standards".9 As such, it could potentially lead
to foreign influence over our domestic environmental policies and standards.
Yet the agreement will certainly elevate the status of environmental
protection efforts made during future trade negotiations.
Following the Introduction, Part II of this Note will briefly discuss
the way that environmental law is formed on both the domestic and
international levels. Part III will discuss the tenuous relationship between
free trade and the environment, including some background on two of the
most influential international trade agreements; the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"), 0 as well as Executive Order 13,141. Part IV of this Note
will examine the fast track authority sought by President Bush and the debate
surrounding it. Part V will outline the newly implemented Jordan Free Trade
Agreement ("JFTA") and the environmental provision contained therein. Part
V will also include an analysis of the procedures for enforcement of the
JFTA and what it means for United States domestic law. Part VI explains
why the JFTA is an improvement over past trade agreements that sought to
implement environmental aims. The Conclusion suggests that although the
JFTA looks like a step in the right direction, it is too soon to tell what
influence it will have in future international negotiations.
7 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002) (hereinafter JFTA). The
ratification of treaties is discussed in Part III.B.
8 Warren Vieth & Janet Hook, After the Attack; U.S. Policy; Senate Passes Free-Trade Pact
with Key Ally Jordan; Mideast: Legislators drop objections against largely symbolic
measure to produce a weapon infighting terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at A8.
91d.
'0 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
" Exec. Order No. 13,141, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1999), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 766 (2000) (directing
environmental review of Trade Agreements).
510 [Vol. 27:509
THE JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
II. CREATING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Domestic Lawmaking
"Customary international law recognizes the right of sovereign
nations to exploit resources and promulgate environmental regulations within
the nation."' 2  In the United States, the domestic process involves "1)
passage of statutes by Congress; or 2) promulgation of rules and regulations
by administrative agencies. Mainly the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") . *.".., Federal agencies must have statutory authority to
promulgate regulations.14 Congress is considered empowered to pass statutes
regarding the environment based on its constitutional authority to regulate
interstate commerce. 5 The several states may enact local environmental
policy as well, but pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Federal
Constitution, federal law will trump in the case of a conflict. 6
United States environmental laws provide a comprehensive scheme
of environmental protection."7 Their effectiveness is limited, however, when
applied to environmental problems that extend beyond national borders, as
the United States does not have jurisdiction over the activity of foreign
nations. 8 The National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") 9 , passed in
1969, may have been the single most important development in domestic
environmental protection in the United States.2 ° The EPA has promulgated
regulations implementing NEPA, including a policy aimed at facilitating
public participation in decisions involving the environment. 2' Courts have
12 Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GA7T and Multilateral
Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 341,349 (1996).
3 Sharma, supra note 2, at 1217.
14 Id.
" See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 Sharma, supra note 2, at 1214.
17 Robins, supra note 6, at 137.
IsId
9 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4321-4347 (2003).
20 Robins, supra note 6, at 137; see also Sharma, supra note 2 (discussing how NEPA
outlines the federal government's goal of providing every American with healthful and
aesthetically pleasing surroundings through the use of federal programs and resources).
21 Sharma, supra note 2, at 1218-19.
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also "contributed to the legitimacy of [domestic environmental] regulations
by developing the hybrid rule-making process whereby courts take a 'harder'
look at agency decisions and require more elaborate explanations. 22
B. International Lawmaking
International law is law between sovereign states.- International law
is usually created either by treaties (also called conventions or agreements)
or custom. 24  Relative to domestic lawmaking, opportunities for public
involvement in international lawmaking are limited. International law creates
obligations only through consent. Thus, a treaty is an agreement voluntarily
entered into by the governments of nations.
Customary international law is based on the practice of nations and
is usually formed when a given belief or practice is shared among nations.26
These nations assert that they have acted in accord with that practice or belief
because they believe themselves to be bound to do so. 7 "Unlike treaties, the
form of consent to custom can be either express or implied."28
Binding international rules relating to the environment most
21
commonly take the form of treaties. Once a state has signed a treaty it is
obliged to do nothing that would defeat the object and purpose of that
treaty.30 The treaty will be binding upon the parties once it enters into force.
The provisions of each individual treaty determine how and when a treaty
enters into force. 3' Frequently a treaty will enter into force after a certain
number of signatories have ratified it.32 The United States considers treaties
22 Id. at 1220.
23 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (1998) [hereinafter BROWNLIE].
24 Anderson & Grewell, supra note 5, at 433.
25 Id. A treaty can also be an agreement between an international organization and a
sovereign government. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 23.26 
"The binding nature of customary international law requires two elements: the state action
must be settled and it must be done out of a sense of obligation." Sharma, supra note 2, at
1225.
27 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 23.
28 Sharma, supra note 2, at 1225.
29 Id. at 1224.
30 BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 606-07.
" Id. at 611. The terms of a treaty may also "specify the conditions of its termination, and
a bilateral treaty may provide for denunciation by the parties." Id. at 617.32 Id. at 611-12.
[Vol. 27:509512
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to be non-self executing. 33 Thus, the ratification process in the United States
requires the approval of a super-majority (two-thirds) of the Senate.34 In the
case of a trade accord that requires a change in United States tariffs, the
President must also obtain legislation from Congress that allows him make
those changes.35 A duly ratified treaty assumes the status of federal law and
trumps any state law or prior inconsistent federal law.36
"The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic
constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community
consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal personality., 37 Thus,
on the international legal stage states are not qualified as "developed" or
"developing," rather, they all stand on equal footing as sovereigns of their
respective territories. Arguments made by a state to the effect that a
particular provision of an international agreement should not apply because
it deprives that state of its sovereignty in a particular area of law have not
been well received by international tribunals.38 It is precisely a state's
sovereignty that allows it to contract out of its rights without the interference
of external forces. However, restrictions upon the independence of states
will not be presumed. 39 "The corollary of the independence and equality of
states is the duty on the part of states to refrain from intervention in the
internal or external affairs of other states., 40 For example, the designation of
a state's territorial sea is a matter that falls within that state's domestic
13 In the absence of an express provision, a right of denunciation may be inferred from the
intentions of the parties as expressed through the terms of the treaty and its subject matter.
However, pursuant to the Vienna Convention, it is presumed that the treaty is not subject to
denunciation or withdrawal. Id.
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
" Steve Charnovitz, No Time for NEPA: Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 195, 199 (1994).
36 Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law Against the Federal and State
Governments, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1269 (1991). "The Supreme Court has held that treaties
are equal in force to federal statutes and that customary international law is comparable, if
not superior, to federal common law." Id. at 1269. This integration into federal law raises
federalism concerns when discussing the issues surrounding fast-track authority (discussed
infra Part IV).
37 BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 287.
38 See generally id.
'9 Id. at 289-90.
40 Id. at 291 ("Matters within the competence of states under general international law are
said to be within the reserved domain, the domestic jurisdiction, of states.")
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jurisdiction.4' But when the issue is enforcement of a state's territorial limit
with reference to other states, it is a matter more properly handled on the
international plane. 2 Therefore, in certain situations international law may
restrict the domestic territorial competence of states as a result of treaty
obligations, or custom. 43 According to Professor Brownlie,
The relativity of the concept of the reserved domain is
illustrated by the rule that a state cannot plead provisions of
its own law or deficiencies in that law in answer to a claim
against it for an alleged breach of its obligations under
international law, and also by the fact that a particular
international obligation may refer to national law as a means
of describing a status to be created or protected.'
Black's Law Dictionary defines "enforcement" as "[t]he act or process of
compelling compliance with a law, mandate, or command., 45  On the
domestic level, the law is enforced through the executive and judicial
branches of government, usually in the form of sanctions such as fines or
incarceration. There are those who feel that the international legal system is
not a legal system at all because it lacks such enforcement mechanisms.46
This belief rests on the presumption that citizens comply with domestic law
because the sanctions exist.47 Yet there can be no doubt that we have all
obeyed the law at times when we were certain no sanction would result, such
as stopping at a stop sign when there is not another car around for miles.48
Nevertheless, in an attempt to create some international enforcement
institutions, bodies such as the United Nations Security Council and, on
occasion, International Criminal Tribunals, have been created.
49
41 Id. at 292.
42 Id.
4' BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 292.
44 Id.
45 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (7th ed. 1999).
41Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental Law,
3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995).
47 Id.
48 Of course, the compliance in this situation may simply be the learned behavior resulting
from fear of sanctions imposed by law enforcement.49 O'Connell, supra note 46. The Council has authority to enforce the law only against those
states threatening international peace and security. Id. at 51. The primary international
[Vol. 27:509514
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There are also courts in the international system, such as the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ").5  Because states must consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, however, it has minimal enforcement capabilities.
More often than not, in order to avoid straining diplomatic relations,
international legal disputes are resolved through less formal means such as
negotiations. The parties to an international agreement may specify in the
agreement what dispute resolution mechanism is to be utilized in case of a
conflict.
III FREE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. On the Side of Free Trade
There are those who feel that the United States' foreign policy should
be driven by economic considerations. This movement toward globalization
of the economy has recently been pursued through the promotion of trade
liberalization.5' Proponents of free trade agreements argue that "free trade
will stimulate trading among nations with different comparative advantages
in producing goods, which will bring economic benefit to all nations
involved."52 Furthermore, they suggest that by encouraging investment in
poorer countries, free-trade policies will foster equality among nations.53
They also suggest that creating wider markets will promote more
competition.54 Increased competition leads to enhanced productivity,
technological innovation and, ultimately, more efficient markets.55
According to James Holbein,
institution concerned with protecting the environment is the United Nations Environment
Programme ("UNEP"). Robins, supra note 6 at 132. "UNEP's basic purposes are to
disseminate information to expand environmental awareness, to participate in technical
cooperation with developing nations, to help improve domestic environmental laws and
institutions, to facilitate global and regional agreements on the environment, and to mediate
disputes of environmental issues." Robins, supra note 6, at 132.
50 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 23.
"' Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 5, at 207.
52 Id. at 208.
53 Id. at 209.
54 id.
55 id.
2002] 515
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
Dismantling barriers to trade and investment increases trade,
which in turn spurs economic growth, productivity gains, and
job creation. Businesses benefit from predictable rules of
doing business across their borders. Consumers benefit from
lower prices and a greater variety of products. Businesses and
all trading partners realize gains in efficiency. The bottom
line is enhanced competitiveness for goods and services
traded from liberalized economies in the global market-
place.56
It is argued that attaching environmental standards to free trade agreements
only creates barriers to free trade by limiting the ability of countries to
manufacture goods unencumbered by regulatory restrictions. Some authors
suggest that,
the effort to subject future trade agreements to more stringent
environmental review risks slowing and even halting future
trade agreements altogether, with enormous impacts on trade
and world prosperity. The long-term effects of stifling wealth
creation will harm environmental quality, as developing
countries and former Communist countries take longer to
grow wealthy enough to afford improving environmental
quality.57
Yet, in the extreme, this line of thought would have all countries repealing
whatever environmental laws they have on their books in favor of
unrestrained production and regardless of short-term negative environmental
impacts. In addition, any attempt to draw a line between environmental
provisions that are not in some way trade barriers, and those that are, merely
creates a false dichotomy. The very purpose of environmental regulations is
to restrain processes of manufacturing goods that create environmental
51 James R. Holbein, The Case for Free Trade, 15 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 20
(1992).
" Anderson & Grewell, supra note 5, at 438. "After almost three decades, many developing
countries continue to suspect that environmental reviews [see infra Part III. C.] will develop
into a precondition for trade liberalization that links environmental protection requirements
with trade access." James Salzman, Executive Order 13,141, and the Environmental Review
of Trade Agreements, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 366, 379 (2001).
[Vol. 27:509516
THE JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
hazards and to encourage the development of alternative production methods
that contribute to a healthier environment. This usually involves increased
cost to the manufacturer and consumer. If a country decided to outlaw the
importation of vegetables cultivated with high levels of pesticides, then any
foreign vegetable producer who wanted to sell its goods in the United States
would have to modify its production methods to accord with the United
States standards.58 To proponents of free trade this would be a protectionist
obstacle to free trade, "because imports from countries that do not meet the
regulations could be eliminated."59
The bottom line in the argument in favor of free trade policies is that
free trade will lead to an increase in the standard of living throughout the
world.6" This "wealthier is healthier" mantra has developed from "economic
research linking wealth to environmental quality., 6' The "Environmental
Kuznets Curve hypothesis" says that "once income reaches a certain per
capita level, pollution decreases because additional resources can now be
devoted to pollution prevention and control."62 Yet the hypothesis has
limitations.63 While there have been studies that support a finding that there
is a relationship between reduced pollution and increased wealth, the results
are not uniform as among different nations with the same pollutants, and
pollutants most closely associated with economic growth, such as greenhouse
gases and hazardous waste pollutants, do not follow the trend at all.'
Predicting the consequences of any particular free trade agreement is highly
speculative,65 which limits the effectiveness and predictive value of
environmental impact statements, as discussed below.
58 See Bernabe-Riefhohl, supra note 5, at 211 ("If foreign producers want to sell their product
in the country that has enacted these regulations, they would have to modify their product
procedures.").
'9 Id. at 212.
60 Id. at 209.
6i Anderson & Grewell, supra note 5, at 441.
62 James Salzman, Seattle's Legal Legacy and Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements,
31 ENVTL. L. 501, 518 (2001). The Kuznets Curve hypothesis is "[t]he classic argument of
free traders, reiterated in virtually every WTO publication on the subject. . . ." Id.
63 Id.
64Id. at 518-19.
65 "Just as increased production and consumption can degrade land, air, and water, economic
growth can provide the necessary resources to address these same environmental problems.
Hence the environmental implications of liberalized trade may be both positive and negative,
direct and indirect, depending on the sector, economy and track measure." Id. at 519.
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B. The Argument in Opposition of Free Trade
Possible consequences of unrestrained free trade include the
"deterioration of the ozone layer, global warming, deforestation, water and
air pollution, massive oil and chemical spills, acid rain, waste disposal, and
nuclear hazards."66 These consequences are all inherent in an effort to
expand markets because it is more profitable, at least in the short-term, to
conduct a business without having to comply with environmental
regulations.67 In addition, trade agreements may increase adverse
environmental impacts because "[t]he greater flows of investment, goods,
and services one might expect from trade liberalization will induce relative
price changes, thereby reallocating productive resources from certain sectors
to others and influencing the levels and patterns of both production and
,,68
consumption.
The disagreement between proponents of free trade and
environmentalists, however, does not seem to be whether trade liberalization
threatens to damage the environment, but rather what should be done about
it.69 More specifically, the argument seems to be over which goal, trade
liberalization/globalization or protection of the environment, should carry the
most weight in foreign policy decision making. Environmental protection
theory is "based on the premise that protecting the environment is
'objectively necessary in itself,"' and thus "it cannot be restricted simply to
advance the values of economic development.'70
66 Bemabe-Riefkohl, supra note 5, at 210.
67 1d. at 210-11.
68 Salzman, supra note 62, at 507.
69 None of the debates surrounding the ratification of the JFTA and conflicts between
environmental protection and trade liberalization involved discussion of trade promotion
without any concern for the environment. It seems as though the opposing factions are not
arguing over which side is right but rather, where in the middle they should reach a
compromise.
70 Bernabe-Riefkohl, supra note 5, at 211 (citing Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach
to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1992) (citing ROGER
J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 50 (1989)).
[Vol. 27:509
THE JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
C. NAFTA and GATT
It is easy to see the conflict between environmental protection and
trade liberalization by looking at two major trade agreements: the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") "1 and the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").72 NAFTA and Executive Order 13, 141, 73
issued by President Clinton in 1999, led the way for the integration of
environmental considerations into the Jordan Free Trade Agreement.
GATT was created after World War II in order to promote
international trade.7 4 The international community created GATT with hopes
of avoiding a post-war depression like the one that had followed World War
C 5 Article I of GATT is the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") provision,
which requires that "any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by
any contracting party to any product originating in ... any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like products
originating ... in all other contracting parties." 76 Article Ill mandates
national treatment of like products, which essentially requires that imports
be treated in the same manner as all other like products." This treatment
standard includes the application of taxes and regulations.78 "This
requirement that all like products be treated equally limits a GATT
contracting party's ability to regulate a product based on its environmental
impact."79 This, however, is not inconsistent with the policy of the agreement
because "GATT does not seek to promote environmental protection or
71 See GATT, supra note 10.
72 See NAFTA, supra note 4. NAFTA was initiated and negotiated as part of President
George Herbert Walker Bush's economic and trade program. During his campaign for the
presidency, President Clinton supported the "basic tenets" of NAFTA, but wanted better
protection of the environment from increased trade and industrialization. Robins, supra note
6, at 123.
7' Exec. Order No. 13,141, supra note 11. For an in-depth discussion of the order, see
Salzman, supra note 62.
7" Robins, supra note 6, at 123.
" Id. at 123-24.
76 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 350 (quoting from GATT art. 1(1)).
71 Id. at 350-51.
78 Id. at 350.
71 Id. at 351.
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sustainable development. In fact, the GATT preamble states that GATT is
meant to facilitate the 'full use of the natural resources of the world.' 80
Article III can create a conflict between obligations under GATT and
environmental protection when a country has environmental standards that
prohibit a specific manufacturing process.8 Products manufactured in
different ways are still "like products" for the purposes of Article III. This
problem arose in the early nineties when, pursuant to the Marine Mammal
Protection Act ("MMPA"),82 the United States effectively outlawed
importation of tuna from Mexico because Mexican fishing techniques caused
the incidental killing of dolphins and porpoises. 3 Mexico took the issue
before a GATT panel,84 claiming that the MMPA was an illegal non-tariff
trade barrier in violation of GATT obligations.85 In other words, Mexico
believed that the United States was violating Article III of GATT by treating
tuna imported from Mexico differently than tuna imported from other
contracting countries. The GATT panel ruled that Mexico's case was valid.86
GATT Article XX lists exceptions thatjustify measures that would otherwise
violate a contracting party's obligations.8 7 Specifically, Article XX(b)
provides an exception for action necessary to protect the life or health of
humans, animals or plants. 8 The GATT panel, however, found that the
exception was meant to apply to efforts at protecting humans, animals or
plants found within the territory of the importing country.89 Thus, the United
States could not use an Article XX exception to effect change in Mexican
policy, but Article III effectively allowed Mexico to side-step a United States
policy.90 The success of Mexico's challenge of the MMPA caught the
80Id. at 356.
81 See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 351.
82 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
83 Glenn M. Stoddard, Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement for US.
Environmental Law & Policy, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 317,320 (1994).84 GATT Dispute Panel on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin], available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/
gattpanelstunadlphinl .pdf.
85 Stoddard, supra note 83.
86 Id.
87 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 352.
88 Id. at 353.
89 Id.
" GATT panel reports are binding only when adopted by the GATT Council, and that never
happened with the Tuna-Dolphin report. Instead, the United States and Mexico entered into
a compromise agreement. Stoddard, supra note 83, at 320.
520 [Vol. 27:509
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attention of environmentalists91 and helped to make possible a heightened
role for environmental protection in the NAFTA negotiations.92
Subsequently, when the European Community and other nations that
were subject to another MMPA boycott, challenged the actions of the United
States, a second Tuna-Dolphin GATT panel report was issued.93 Tuna-
Dolphin 11, contrary to the first Tuna-Dolphin decision, "found that the text
of Article XX(b) did not place a limitation on the location of the living things
to be protected."94  Instead the panel "found that an action was only
necessary when other alternatives which are otherwise consistent with GATT
are exhausted."" More importantly, the panel determined that the United
States' action of placing an embargo on tuna from foreign countries would
only effectively protect the life of the dolphins and porpoises if those
countries changed their fishing practices, and Article XX(b) "as a matter of
policy, could not be interpreted to allow one member nation to force a change
in the policies of another member nation."96 During NAFTA negotiations,
environmental groups lobbied for an environmental impact statement
("EIS")97 of the agreement.98 In response to this pressure, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative ("USTR") prepared a voluntary review
of environmental issues likely to arise in NAFTA.99 This voluntary review
was unprecedented for a trade agreement, but the environmental community
9'Id. at 320.
9 See Salzman, supra note 62, at 507-08.
3 GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, May 20,
1994, § 5.8,33 I.L.M. 839,888 [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin11], available athttp://www.world
tradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinl 1 .pdf.
94 Fletcher, supra note 12, at 353.9 5 Id.
' Id. at 354. The report established a three step analysis to use in determining whether an
Article XX(b) exception exists. Initially a determination must be made as to whether the
challenged policy was in fact designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.
Second, it must be determined whether the actions taken were "necessary," as the panel has
defined that term. Lastly, a determination must be made regarding whether the measures
taken are an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries with similar
conditions. Id. at 353.
9 Environmental impact statements attempt to characterize and quantify the likely
environmental impacts of specific government actions. NEPA, which was passed by
Congress in 1969, requires that an EIS be done for all "major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." Salzman, supra note 62, at 505.
981 Id. at 508.
" The review followed many of the NEPA procedures for E.I.S. Id.
2002]
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wanted a formal EIS. The USTR filed suit in United States District Court
after President Clinton submitted the agreement to Congress and signed the
Agreement into law.'0° In Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative,'°' the
district court ordered that the USTR prepare an EIS for NAFTA, but the
Clinton administration feared losing Fast Track Authority 2 and possibly
NAFTA as well, so they appealed the decision and it was reversed on
Administrative Law grounds0 3 by the District of Columbia Circuit Court. 04
Despite this loss, the efforts of the environmental groups effected an
"important watershed in U.S. trade policy" by pressuring the USTR into
doing an independent review that "significantly influenced the shape of the
final agreements."' 5 The NAFTA review demonstrated that reviews "could
inform and promote trade rather than obstruct them."' 0 6
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,141 ("The Order")'0 7 in
November of 1999, "committing the government for the first time to conduct
environmental reviews of trade agreements."'0 8 The first EIS conducted
under the Order was for the Jordan Free Trade Agreement.109 The
effectiveness of this process, however, is questionable because the Order
requires an evaluation of only the domestic impact of trade agreements, and
"[t]he impacts in the United States of increased trade with Jordan are
negligible." "0 Furthermore, the EIS takes place during negotiations before
"~ The suit was originally filed prior to implementation of the agreement, but it was
dismissed for lack of standing and lack of final agency action. Id. at 508-09.
101 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
102 See infra Part V.
'03 The court found that the "final agency action" challenged was the submission of NAFTA
to Congress by the President, and because the NAFTA vested in the President the discretion
to determine whether or not to submit the agreement to Congress, it was his action that
affected the environmental groups. The court ruled that actions of the President were not
Agency action and thus not reviewable by the court. Pub. Citizen v. United States Trade
Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
'04 Salzman, supra note 62, at 509.
05 The environmental side agreement to NAFTA attempts to address the concerns discussed
in the review. Id. at 509-10.
106 Id. at 509.
'07 Exec. Order No. 13,141, supra note 11. The Order "commits the U.S. Government to
'factor environmental considerations into the development of its trade negotiating objectives
[through] a process of ongoing assessment and evaluation, and, in certain instances, written
environmental reviews."' Salzman, supra note 62, at 521-22 (alteration in original).
10' Salzman, supra note 62, at 503.
'09 Id. at 530-31.
"o Id. at 531. "As U.S. trading partners go, Jordan barely shows up on the ledger books. Last
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the terms of the agreement have even been solidified. Nevertheless, in
accordance with the Clinton Administration's Declaration on Environmental
Trade Policy,"' which pledged to "pursue trade liberalization . . in a
manner that is supportive of our commitment to high levels of protection for
the environment," ' 1 2 the USTR pushed to include "environmental measures
in the agreement with the hope of strengthening Jordan's environmental
protection efforts."' 3
IV. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
A. The Legislation
The constitutional requirements for treaty ratification can limit the
President's ability to negotiate international agreements. Other governments
realize that although they may be negotiating with the President, Congress
may yet amend the terms or even forego the entire agreement. This is an
important democratic safeguard because it serves as a check on the power of
the executive. "' Although foreign relations is an area of governance uniquely
executive in nature, any binding treaty that results from those relations is
legislative in nature and thus must be ratified by the Senate in much the same
way as a bill of domestic origin. Unfortunately, this means that the same
political pressures, including partisans and lobbyists, that are brought to bear
on the President on domestic issues are present on the international plane as
well. In order to remedy this "Presidential infirmity" a new "fast-track"
procedure was developed." 5 "Fast track authority [FTA] allows the Pres-
ident... to initiate foreign trade affairs which are automatically discharged
from committee review in the Senate and the House of Representatives after
a limited period of time, encounter restricted debate on the floor of each
year, it supplied Americans with $73 million worth ofjewelry, clothing, carpets, antiques and
other goods and services-a minuscule slice of total U.S. imports of $1.4 trillion." Vieth &
Hook, supra note 8.
.. White House Policy Declaration on Environment and Trade (Nov. 16, 1999).
112 Salzman, supra note 62, at 504.
"' Id. at 531.
114 See Sharma, supra note 2. "The President's primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs
effectively forecloses the opportunity for meaningful participation by the public-and by
Congress to a lesser extent-in the negotiation and formulation of international
environmental accords." Id. at 1215.
"5 Charnovitz, supra note 35, at 199.
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house, and without being subject to amendments.""' 6 Fast Track Authority
("FTA") originated in the Trade Act of 197417 and was subsequently
modified in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,'s which expanded the
influence of Congress over the negotiation of trade agreements." 9 FTA was
modified again in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ("OCTA")
of 1988, 20which further enhanced Congress's gate-keeping power and added
a procedure for terminating the authority, or "reversing" it.' 2' The bilateral
treaty-making authority provided for by the Trade Act of 1984 and OCTA
was used for NAFTA negotiations and had previously been used for approval
of the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement 22 the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement. 23
The President's fast track authority for both bilateral and multilateral
trade negotiations ceased on December 15, 1993.124 Efforts on the part of the
Clinton administration to renew fast track authority were derailed by
disagreements within Congress regarding the inclusion of labor and
environmental issues in agreements approved by the procedure. 25 Bush and
his trade representative Bob Zoellick, have made fast track, dubbed Trade
Promotion Authority ("TPA"), one of their top priorities 26 and on December
7, 2001, the House passed TPA legislation by a narrow one-vote margin. 27
16 Lenin Guerra, Note, The Use of Fast Track Authority in the Negotiations of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 172, 172 (1999).
"1 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2111 (2000).
118 Tariff and Trade Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C.§ 2112 (2000).
"s9 Guerra, supra note 116, at 172-73.
120 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C § 2901 (2000)).
121 Guerra, supra note 116, at 173.
122 United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99
Stat. 82 (1985) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
123 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.
(2000)).
124 Charnovitz, supra note 35, at 203.
125 Guerra, supra note 116, at 174.
126 J.L. Laws, Senate Committee Approves Jordan Free Trade Agreement, ENV'T& ENERGY
DAILY, July 27, 2001; Richard W. Stevenson, Senate Votes to Lift Barriers to Jordan Trade,
N.Y. TMES, Sept. 25, 2001.
127 Joseph Kahn, House Supports Trade Authority Sought By Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2001,
at Al.
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There seems to be a consensus that FTA/TPA 128 has been a useful tool
in trade negotiations. The disagreement is over putting limitations on that
authority. Those in favor of unrestricted TPA argue that it gives the President
more credibility at the negotiating table, which will create more opportunities
for American manufacturers and farmers. 129 Those opposed to TPA are
concerned that, without some sort of regulatory scheme, TPA would be used
to negotiate deals that benefit business interests at the expense of labor and
environmental concerns. 3 ' That regulatory 'scheme comes in the form of
labor and environmental provisions like those included in the JFTA. National
Wildlife Federation Director, Paul Joffe, says "[flast-track legislation [TPA]
should ensure that trade agreements support-and do not undermine-
environmental protection. 131
When negotiating a free trade agreement, the President should have
the authority contemplated by TPA. Unfortunately, partisan politics often
have more influence on policy decisions than doing what is best for the
country and the global community. This means that TPA in any given
President's hands can yield widely varying results. Environmental policy
may take several steps forward only to suffer a leap backwards. Therefore,
TPA will prove most effective if a non-partisan standard of including
environmental provisions in trade agreements is set. This precedent may be
achieved by the JFTA.
B. The Debate
Senate Republican Phil Gramm of Texas says he fears that "including
labor and environmental provisions [in all trade agreements] would lead to
a loss of sovereignty by the United States and subject the country to penalties
for pursuing its economic self-interest.' 3 Senator Gramm is a staunch
supporter of free trade and feels that FTA has been successful at creating
healthy world economies in the post-World War II era. 133 However, Gramm
argues that Congress originally agreed to limit its power under Article I of
128 Fast track and trade promotion authority are used interchangeably in this note.
129 Laws, supra note 126; see discussion on FTA supra Part IV.B.
130 id.
131 US. -Jordan Trade Agreement a First for Environment, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 4,
2001.
132 Stevenson, supra note 126.
133 147 CONG. REC. S9679, S9685 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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the Constitution because FTA dealt with only external matters, it was not
used to create domestic laws that would govern the well-being of American
people.'34 "When you allow the President to negotiate labor and
environmental laws, and labor and environmental standards [like those
included in the JFTA], under fast-track authority, where the agreement
cannot be debated and cannot be amended, what you are literally doing is
giving the President of the United States a unilateral power to write domestic
law under fast-track authority."' 3 5 This extension of power, says Gramm,
was never contemplated by Congress when they passed FTA, and will serve
to limit the effectiveness of FTA when Congress has to vote down an
agreement because non-trade matters are included.'36 Senator Gramm will
likely support the TPA bill as long as requirements of including labor and
environmental standards in trade agreements are not attached to the authority.
Gramm's second argument is that America would be relinquishing
some of its sovereignty to the World Trade Organization and to dispute
resolution organizations, allowing third parties to decide whether we can
alter our existing domestic environmental standards. 137 The Senator says that
he would have no objections if Americans made the determination of
whether the United States was meeting the provisions of the Agreement. '3
Senator Hagel (Neb.) points out that trade sanctions do not address the root
of environmental or labor problems or other such problems, which
international organizations such as the United Nations are currently better at
handling.'39 Others simply assert that the grant of presidential authority must
be as free and open as possible and unencumbered by regulatory restrictions,
like environmental and labor standards, that will only serve to undermine our
long-term economic security. 4 °
Yet Senator Gramm's position seems to side-step the fact that in the
past ten years other areas of domestic law, such as patent and copyright, have
been included in trade agreements without causing the constitutional
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at S9686.
137 Id.
38 Id. at S9687.
'19 147 CONG. REC. S9687 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hagel).
141 Jack Kemp, Trade, Terror.. and What the Economy Needs, WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 3,
2001, at A16.
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dilemma he predicts.' 4' His only response is that because the United States
holds ninety percent of all the patents and copyrights in the world, simply
requiring that other countries respect patent and copyright laws has no effect
on America. '42 At the very least, the experience with inclusion of patent and
copyright issues should justify waiting until the results are in before
pronouncing judgment.
If it is fair to say that Senator Gramm is quarterbacking the opposition
to the inclusion of environmental protection provisions in free trade
agreements, then Senator Baucus (Mont.) is calling the plays for the
proponents. Baucus, who supported the JFTA ever since President Clinton
negotiated it, calls it "progressive" and characterizes the labor and
environmental provisions as "positive developments that point the way
toward further progress."' 43 In response to Senator Gramm's loss of
sovereignty argument, Baucus argues that pursuant to the JFTA, "[n]o
arbitrator can order the United States to change its practices... ,144 "Under
the agreement," Baucus says,
dispute settlement will be based on nonbinding mediation
-not arbitration but nonbinding mediation. That is very
important. In other words, even in the unlikely event that the
three conditions [of a violation] are met, and a mediator-not
an arbitrator-and a mediator finds against the United States,
that determination is purely advisory, intended only to guide
the parties in resolving any disputes through consultation. 145
Senator Baucus, in support of his argument, looks to an exchange of
letters between Ambassador Zoellick, President Bush's Trade
Representative, and Ambassador Muasher, Jordan's Ambassador to the
United States. 46 The letters, exchanged on July 23, 2001, express an
agreement between the two governments that, should a difference of opinion
arise as to the proper interpretation of the JFTA, they will make "every effort
141 147 CONG. REC. S9685 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
142 Id.
41 Id. at S9680 (statement of Sen. Baucus).
144 Id.
145 id.
146 Id. at S9680-81.
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to resolve them without recourse to formal dispute settlement procedures." 147
Specifically, the letters refer to using formal dispute settlement procedures
to "[block] trade," a reference to the use of trade sanctions. 48 However, the
letters are not an amendment to the JFTA and do not change it in any way.1
49
Baucus also urges opponents to consider what might happen if these sorts of
provisions are not included in trade agreements. '50 He suggests that, without
provisions like Article 5 of the JFTA,' 5 1 governments would be free to adjust
their domestic laws in order to gain an unfair trade advantage. 
52
V. THE UNITED STATES-JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. History and Motivations
On June 6, 2000, President Clinton and Jordan's King Abdullah II
announced that the governments of the United States and Jordan would enter
into negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. 53 Clinton and King
Abdullah II signed the agreement, 154 the first between the United States and
an Arab nation, 55 on October 24, 2000.156 The agreement is hailed as
"groundbreaking" by both sides, potentially "attract[ing] multinational
investment to economically ailing Jordan, encouraging economic growth and
14' Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ambassador Marwan
Muasher, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (July 23,2001), reprinted in 147
CONG. REC. S9681 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001). The text of the letter from Ambassador
Muasher to Ambassador Zoellick is identical to that of the letter from Ambassador Zoellick
to Ambassador Muasher. 147 CONG. REC. S9681 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (read into the
record by Sen. Baucus) [hereinafter Letter].
141 147 CONG. REC. S9681 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement by Sen. Baucus).
149 id.
0 Id. at 9682.
'' Article 5 of the JFTA is the article dealing with environmental standards.
512 147 CONG. REC. S9682 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement by Sen. Baucus), reprinted
in 147 CONG. REC. 9681.
53 See Richard Keil, U.S., Jordan Set to Begin Negotiations on a Trade Agreement,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 6, 2000, available at LEXIS, Bloomberg News File.
' Where the signature is subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, as in the United
States, the signiature does not establish consent to be bound. Signature also does not create
an obligation to ratify. Signature does, however, "qualif[y] the signatory state to proceed to
ratification ,acceptance, or approval and creates an obligation of good faith to refrain from
acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the treaty." BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 606-07.
J Vieth & Hook, supra note 8.
156 JFTA, supra note 7.
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creating jobs."' 57 Negotiated during the Middle East peace talks, the JFTA
is a culmination of the economic and political relationship formed between
the United States and Jordan since Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty in
1994.58 National Security Counsel spokesman P.J. Crowley says that
"[h]aving a stable, prosperous Jordan within the region.., is important for
Middle East peace."' 59 The JFTA was very much a political agreement that
has had little economic impact. 60
The Clinton administration promoted the agreement as "a new model
for trade agreements--one with the potential to attract union support,
because it mandates compliance with international labor and environmental
norms."'' Yet, it is precisely these provisions that stalled the agreement in
Congress for a year. As the first American trade initiative to include labor
and environmental standards as part of the main text, the JFTA puts the rights
of workers and the duty of companies not to pollute on the same plane with
tariffs.'62 In a meeting with King Abdullah II in April of 2001, President
Bush indicated that the labor and environmental provisions of the agreement
might require readjustment. 6 3 The White House was concerned "about the
precedent that the labor and environmental agreements might have on future
trade agreements."' ' 4
Everything changed after September 11, 2001. Senator Gramm
dropped his months-long effort to block the implementation of the JFTA
after receiving calls from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Condolee-
zza Rice, President Bush's National Security Advisor. 65 Senator Gramm
explained that he decided not to oppose the agreement because "it was
" Joseph Kahn, Dual Purpose of a U.S.-Jordan Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at
A16.
.58 See Vieth & Hook, supra note 8. Jordan and the United States worked together to
accomplish Jordan's accession to the World Trade Organization and they have worked
together on other matters involving trade and investment. JFTA, supra note 7.
159 Keil, supra note 153.
160 Vieth & Hook, supra note 8. "Annual trading between Jordan and the United States,
which totaled just over $300 million last year, is comparatively minuscule. The United States
and Mexico trade more with each other on an average day." Kahn, supra note 157.
161 Kahn, supra note 157.
162 Marc Lacey, Bush Seeking to Modify Pact on Trade with Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2001, at A7.
163 Id.
1641 de161 Stevenson, supra note 126.
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important that the United States send a signal of friendship to Jordan, an ally
that could be instrumental in building support in the Middle East for military
and other action against the terrorists."' 66 Even President Bush, who
originally wanted to amend the agreement, was quoted by the Associated
Press as having said that "'[t]he U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement will
promote peace and security in the region, while creating jobs and new
investment opportunities in both countries'.,"167 Senator Baucus, Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, said that implementing the JFTA was a
way to reinforce Jordan's support of the war on terrorism. 16 President Bush
signed the implementing legislation on September 28, 2001, and the
agreement entered into force on December 17, 2001.169
B. Article 5
The Jordan Free Trade Agreement achieves significant and extensive
liberalization of trade issues. 7' The agreement will eliminate all "tariff and
non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade in virtually all industrial goods and
agricultural products within ten years." According to former United States
Trade Representative, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, "[the JFTA] can be
a step toward the creation of a future Middle East which is peaceful,
prosperous, and open to the world; whose nations work together for the
common good; and whose people have hope and opportunity."'' In addition,
the agreement includes environmental standards designed to prevent weak
environmental regulations from being used to create trade advantages'72 by
requiring that both nations uphold their environmental laws.'73 Specifically,
Article 5 of the Agreement provides that each party shall "strive to ensure"
that it does not relax or suspend domestic environmental law in order to
1 6 Id.
167 Jim Abrams, Senate OKs PactAllowing Jordan-Free Trade Status, HOUS. CHRON., Sept.
24, 2001, at A6.
168 Id.
169 Jordan's Abdullah and Bush Sign Free Trade Agreement, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
Sept. 28, 2001, at International News.
'
70 See generally JFTA, supra note 7.
171 Charlene Barshefsky, Remarks at the Jordanian-American Business Association in
Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (July 31, 2000), available at http://usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/press/ustr/archive/2000/August/otl0802.htm (Aug. 1, 2000).
172 Joanna Ramey, Vietnam, Jordan Pacts Progress, WOMEN's WORLD DAILY, July 27, 2001,
at 11.
173 Laws, supra note 126.
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promote trade with the other party.174 The second clause of Article 5
reaffirms the discretion that each country has with regard to the
establishment of its own laws, and requires that each party "strive" to provide
high levels of environmental protection. 75 A failure by a party to enforce its
environmental laws must not result from a "sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction" and it must affect trade between the parties. 176 However,
where a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of the
party's discretion, with regard to "investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory,
and compliance matters," or is the result of a "bonafide decision regarding
the allocation of resources," the party has not violated the agreement.
For the purposes of the agreement, "environmental laws" means any
statute or regulation or any part of any statute or regulation that has, as its
"primary purpose," the protection of the environment, or the prevention of
a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health, through:
a) the prevention, abatement or control of the release,
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental
contaminants;
b) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic
chemicals, substances, materials and wastes, and the
dissemination of information related thereto; or
c) The protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna,
including endangered species, their habitat, and specially
protected natural areas in the Party's territory.. .78
Provisions or statutes dealing with worker health or safety do not fall within
the definition of "environmental laws" for the purposes of Article 5.179
JFTA negotiations also resulted in a separate technical assistance
agreement ("The Statement"), which creates a joint body to cooperate on
environmental issues, providing expertise from United States agencies on
problems like waste management. 8 ° The Statement establishes a Joint Forum
1" JFTA, supra note 7, art. 5(1).
175 Id. art. 5(2).
1761d. art. 5(3)(a).
17Id. art. 5(3)(b).
178 Id. art. 5(4).
179 Id.
IS' United-States Jordan Joint Statement on Environmental Technical Cooperation, Ofice
of the United States Trade Representative, 1,3 (Oct. 24, 2000), available at http://www.
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on Environmental Technical Cooperation ("The Forum").'' The mandate of
the Forum is "to advance environmental protection in Jordan by developing
environmental technical cooperation initiatives, which take into account
environmental priorities, and which are agreed to by the two governments,
consistent with the United States country strategic plan for Jordan, and
complementary to United States-Jordanian policy initiatives."1 2 The
Statement anticipates cooperation between the Forum and the Joint
Committee,8 3 established under the JFTA in implementation and
enforcement of Jordanian environmental laws as defined by Article 5(4) of
the JFTA.Y8 4 An annex to the Statement lists programs that "will inform the
development of the agenda of the [Forum]."' 5 The programs "focus on
building human and institutional capacityin environmental management,
compliance assurance and enforcement, and conservation of living and non-
living natural resources.
'186
C. Environmental Impact: The Review
On June 15, 2000, the USTR issued a Federal Register Notice
announcing the Clinton Administration's plan to negotiate a free trade
agreement with Jordan and to conduct an environmental review of the
proposed agreement pursuant to Executive Order 13,141.1"7 The notice
requested written comments from the public to assist the USTR in
formulating negotiating objectives.88 On June 28, 2000, the USTR issued
another notice announcing the initiation of the review and requesting public
ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeastlenvstmt.pdf [hereinafter the Statement].
181Id. 3.
182 Id. A country's strategic plan articulates the specific mission, goals, objectives, and
program approaches of the United States Agency for International Development's
development assistance program in a particular country. Id. at n. 1. Information on the
country strategic plan for Jordan is available at http://www.usaid.gov/regions/ane/newpages/
one_pagers/jordan0 1 a.htm.
,83 See discussion infra Part V.C.
184 Statement, supra note 180, 8.
j8' Selected Environmental Technical Cooperations Programs, in Statement, supra note 180,
annex, at 3.
186 id.
"' Public Comments on Proposed United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreements, 65 Fed. Reg.
37,594 (June 15, 2000) (USTR notice and request for comments).188 Id.
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comments on the scope of that review.'89. According to the notice "Jordan
ha[d] indicated that it plan[ned] to perform its own environmental review of
the free trade agreement."' 90
The USTR environmental review is based on the findings of the
United States International Trade Commission ("USITC") in its investigation
of the economic impacts of the JFTA.' 9' The USITC found that the JFTA
would have "no measurable impacts on total U.S. imports, total U.S. exports,
U.S. production, or U.S. employment."'' 92 "Therefore, the [United States
Government] expects that the environmental effects in the United States
resulting from the changes in trade flows with Jordan as a result of the
[JFTA] will be de minimis."'93
Section 5(b) of Executive Order 13,141, says that the focus of the
Review is supposed to be the possible impacts in the United States, 94 but it
also provides that reviews may examine global and transboundary impacts,
as appropriate.' 9 The review "considered possible transboundary and global
environmental effects of the JFTA on trade in endangered species, migratory
birds, and protected areas".'9 6 With regard to these three areas of concern, the
review states that:
189 Public Comments on Environmental Review of Proposed United States-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,976 (June 26, 2000) (USTR Notice of initiation of review and
request for comments on scope of review).
190Id.
9' Economic Impact on the United States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, USITC,
Pub. No. 3340, Inv. No. 332-418 (Sept. 2000), available at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports
/studies/pub3340.PDF.
"9 Office of United States Trade Representative, Environmental Review of the Proposed
Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area Between the Government of the
United States and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, at 1, 21 (Sept.
2000), available at http://www.ustr.gov/environment/Jordan-environment.PDF [hereinafter
The Review].
'
93 Id. at 20.
194 Exec. Order No. 13,141, supra note 11, § 5(b).
195 Id.
' The Review, supra note 192, at 21. The United States and Jordan are both parties to the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
("CITES"), the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl
Habitat ("Ramsar Convention"), and the Convention Concerning the Protection of World
Cultural and Natural Heritage. Id. at 21, 22.
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The [United States Government ("USG")] is not aware of any
evidence that illegal trafficking in endangered species has
been a problem with Jordan, and on that basis, found that
nothing in the [JFTA] would increase the possibility that such
trafficking would become a problem. The USG focused on
proposed tourist services provisions in the [JFTA] as possibly
relevant to migratory birds and protected areas. As the
proposed [JFTA] provisions liberalize such services only with
respect to foreign investment in tourist restaurants, the USG
is not aware of any evidence that would suggest that these
proposed provisions would have a significant environmental
effect on migratory birds or protected areas.' 97
D. Enforcement: Effect on Domestic Law
As mentioned above, a party violates its obligation under Article 5 of
the JFTA if it fails "to effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a
sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting
trade between the Parties ..... '98 Article 17 provides the dispute settlement
procedure to be followed should a party feel that the other party has not
carried out its obligations under the agreement. 199
The complaining party is required to submit a "request for
consultations."200 If the parties, through consultations, have still not resolved
the dispute sixty days after the submission of such request, either party may
refer the dispute to the Joint Committee,20 ' which shall convene and make an
effort to resolve the matter.20 2 if after the matter has been referred to the Joint
Committee, it has not been resolved within a period of ninety days, or within
19 Id. at 22.
'9' JFTA, supra note 7, art. 5(3)(a).
'9' Id. art. 17(1)(a)(ii).
200 Id. art. 17(1)(b).
201 The Joint Committee will be composed of representatives of the parties and shall be
headed by the United States Trade Representative and Jordan's Minister primarily
responsible for international trade, or their designees. The Committee was established to
supervise the implementation of the agreement and review relations between the parties. It
has its own rules of procedure and decisions are taken by consensus. Id. art. 15.
202 Id. art. 17(1)(b).
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such other period as the Joint Committee has -agreed, then either party may
refer the matter to a, dispute settlement panel.2 °3
"Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, the panel shall be composed
of three members: each Party shall appoint one member, and the two
appointees shall choose a third who will serve as the chairman. 20 4 Within
ninety days after the third member is chosen, the panel will present to the
parties a report containing "findings of fact and its determination as to
whether either Party has failed to carry out its obligations under the
Agreement or whether a measure taken by either Party severely distorts the
balance of trade benefits accorded by [the agreement] or substantially
undermines the fundamental objectives of [the agreement]. ''2°5 Should the
panel find that a party has failed to carry out its obligations, it may, at the
request of the parties, make recommendations for resolution of the dispute.20 6
The report of the panel is nonbinding.0 7 The parties may chose to invoke any
applicable international dispute settlement mechanism under any agreement
to which they are both parties (e.g., World Trade Organization) should the
panel fail for procedural or jurisdictional reasons to make findings of law or
fact.208
Once the panel has presented its report, the Joint Committee shall
make an effort to resolve the dispute, considering the report as appropriate.0 9
If the Joint Committee has still not resolved the dispute within thirty days
after the panel presents its report, the complaining party is entitled to take
"any appropriate and commensurate measure., 2'0 There is no further
explanation of what is included in "any appropriate and commensurate
measure."
211
Article 18 of the agreement states that "[n]either Party may provide
for a right of action under its domestic law against the other Party on the
ground that a measure of the other Party is inconsistent with this
Agreement." 212 The means that the provisions of the JFTA and any decisions
203 Id. art. 17(1)(c).
204 Id.
205 Id. art.17(1)(d).
206 JFTA, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(d).
207 ld.
208Id. art. 17(1)(e).
209Id. art. 17(2)(a).
210 Id. art. 17(2)(b).
211 Id.
212 JFTA, supra note 7, art. 18(1).
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by JFTA dispute-resolution panels are not self-executing and cannot be
applied directly by United States courts.
The possibility that Jordan might impose trade sanctions because it
felt that the United States was using domestic environmental laws or
standards to affect trade left many in Washington feeling uneasy. In order to
relieve some of the tension surrounding the issue, United States Trade
Representative Robert B. Zoellick and Jordan's Ambassador Marwan
Muasher exchanged letters in which the countries state their intention not to
apply the agreement's dispute settlement enforcement procedures in a
manner that results in blocking trade.213 These letters state that bilateral
consultations and other procedures would be appropriate measures that will
help secure compliance without recourse to traditional trade sanctions. 214
These letters, however, do not change the agreement in any way2" and were
merely political lip service necessary to get the implementing legislation
passed. Nevertheless, there is no indication that the parties do not intend to
abide by their mutual assurances, and in all likelihood, the desire to continue
a mutually beneficial alliance weighs against such contrary intentions.
For example, suppose that Congress decides to open up the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge ("ANWR") to produce domestic oil.216 In theory,
an international dispute resolution mechanism may determine that the United
States has lowered its environmental standards to gain trade advantages and,
should the parties fail to come to a mutually agreeable resolution as
contemplated by the exchanged letters, Jordan might impose protective
tariffs on American products.217 It is true that a party has not violated Article
5 of the agreement if the action or inaction in question reflects a "reasonable
exercise of such discretion, 21 8 but it fails to give any standard for
reasonableness and thus there is plenty of room for interpretational
disagreement.1 9 In other words, "Jordan could navigate the [United States]
2' See Letter, supra note 147.
214 Id.
215 147 CONG. REC. S9681 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
216 This was a particular concern expressed by Sen. Gramm in the Senate debate.
217 147 CONG. REC. S9681 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
218 JFTA, supra note 7, art. 5(3)(b).
219 "'Soft law' is the articulation of a norm in a written form, whether it be in the form of
codes of practice, recommendations, guidelines, resolutions, or declarations of principles,
that leaves 'a considerable degree of discretion in interpretation[,] and.., how and when to
conform to the requirements is left to the participants,"' Sharma, supra note 2, at 1226. The
flexibility allowed for by soft-law makes it especially attractive when "dealing with
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laws to find technical violations and employ those violations as an excuse for
sanctions., 220 Being able to find violations will likely "not be a problem
given that a 1993 survey by the National Law Journal found that only thirty
percent of corporate counsels believe that complete compliance with [United
States] environmental laws is even possible."22'
It is also conceivable, since the agreement incorporates Articles III
and XX of GATT, that a situation like the one that led to the Tuna-Dolphin
dispute 222 between Mexico and the United States might arise. This could
result in an inability of the United States to effectively enforce its domestic
environmental laws, the exact opposite of its Article 5 obligation. Still, it is
significant that in Article 12 the parties state that the measures referred to in
Article XX(b) of GATT, as exceptions to the like treatment requirement, are
understood to include environmental measures necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health. 223 Furthermore, the parties understand that
Article XX(g) of GATT "applies to measures relating to conservation of
living and non-living exhaustible natural resources. 224 Perhaps by clarifying
those two points the United States was specifically trying to avoid another
Tuna-Dolphin situation.225
The bottom line is that assuming Jordan could succeed with an
Article 5 challenge, it would be up to Congress to decide whether to pass
legislation to change the law/standard (or delegate that authority to the EPA)
or face the risk of trade sanctions. Indeed, it is a very slight risk226 if parties
adhere to the statements made in the letters they exchanged in July of
2000.227
environmental matters that cross state boundaries or affect the global commons." Id.
220 Anderson & Grewell, supra note 5, at 432.
221 Id.
222 See discussion supra Part III.C.
223 JFTA, supra note 7, art. 12(1).
224 id.
225 As noted supra Part III, however, the MMPA policy was rejected because of a poor
means-ends fit, not because of a misunderstanding as to what the Article XX exceptions
actually covered.
226 See supra note 219 and accompanying text (commenting on "soft-law").
227 See Letter, supra note 147.
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VI. ANALYSIS
What does this all mean and why does it matter? Trade liberalization
is an important mechanism for encouraging economic growth around the
world. It is clear that poor countries are hard pressed to devote resources to
protecting their environment when they are battling famine, disease, and high
unemployment rates. Yet a policy geared solely toward economic growth has
the potential to contribute to those same social problems by depleting natural
resources and creating widespread pollution.
Good economic policy must be formed with the environment in mind.
Before the JFTA, free trade agreements had addressed the environment as an
afterthought. Side agreements, such as the one between the NAFTA
members, may be a necessary starting point to resolve the conflict between
trade liberalization and environmental protection. However, side agreements
are ultimately an insufficient and inefficient means of dealing with the
conflict between trade liberalization and environmental protection because
they treat this conflict as a secondary issue. The JFTA raises the bar a notch
by creating precedent for including environmental provisions in the original
negotiations and agreement.
With the JFTA, President Clinton avoided criticism "for exporting
[United States] environmental and labor standards to a country that could not
afford them" by negotiating the agreement to require only that each country
enforce its own laws.228 Many poor countries do not feel they should be held
to the same standards as such developed countries as the United States
because they have not yet had their "industrial revolutions." '229 Indeed, the
EPA was not created until 1970, at least a full one hundred years after
America's Industrial Revolution began in the early nineteenth century.
In order to achieve long-term improvements in the environmental
protection efforts of developing countries, we should provide incentives for
American trade partners to strengthen their environmental regulations. By
creating positive reinforcement instead of agreeing to withhold negative
228 Anderson & Grewell, supra note 5, at 432.
229 Developing nations have few strengths in the marketplace relative to developed countries
such as the United States, but two of them just happen to be cheap labor and abundant
resources. By including environmental and labor provisions in trade agreements they would
be relinquishing any relative negotiating leverage they may have. Salzman, supra note 62,
at 378. Further, just meeting requirements for environmental reporting often requires more
resources than developing countries have at their command. O'Connell, supra note 46, at 55.
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reinforcement, such as trade sanctions, environmental provisions would be
associated with growth instead of disapprobation. Perhaps the rate of
reduction in tariffs could be tied to improvements made in environmental
regulation, based on the particular conditions of a specific trade partner.
Granted, this sounds less and less like free trade, but once societies have
recognized that economic growth cannot be separated from negative
environmental impacts and other issues such as labor standards, the term
"free trade" becomes an oxymoron.
Presumably, the citizens and lawmakers of countries create
environmental regulations because they feel that environmental protection
is an important part of the political agenda. Thus, there should be internal
political pressures that can serve to counteract any incentives to lower
standards for economic gain. In addition, external political pressures can
serve as a check on policy decisions. This is even more true now, as
multinational organizations such as environmental groups, are becoming
increasingly influential on the world stage. 230
The enforcement procedures included 23' in the agreement would
certainly never be confused with swift justice, but when dealing with a
dispute between two sovereigns, it is more often about negotiations and
compromise than about executive enforcement. Both the United States and
Jordan have expressed their intention to make every effort to resolve any
230 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), "which represent a diverse range of interests
and are citizen-based, have been the most successful at securing any type of participation in
the international environmental lawmaking process." Sharma, supra note 2, at 1231. Some
argue that the participation of NGOs in the negotiations of international law "enhances the
legitimacy of international decision-making." Id. at 1232.
231 In her symposium article on enforcement and international environmental law, Mary Ellen
O'Connell discusses the arguments against using traditional international law enforcement
mechanisms to enforce international environmental law. First, she notes, there is often no
particular prohibitory rule that is violated when environmental damage occurs. Second, she
states that "oftentimes either a state responsible for environmental harm is not a party to a
relevant treaty, or the treaty places no binding obligation on the state to prevent the damage."
O'Connell, supra note 46, at 54. Third, she suggests that literature often attributes the steady
deterioration of our environment to a lack of observation of international environmental rules
when really it is due to the fact that our environmental rules are inadequate. O'Connell says
that a fourth argument is the expense to governments involved in improving the environment,
which is a goal that requires positive action instead of negative action. For the last two
arguments she notes that sanctions may not result in the offending country changing their
policy, and by inducing compliance (instead of enforcing rules) you don't have to wait for
the violation to occur. O'Connell, supra note 46, at 53-57.
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disputes in a mutually agreeable way. Congress ultimately retains its power
to make all decisions regarding domestic policy. It is unlikely that the
concerns expressed by Senator Gramm will prove justified by application of
the JFTA. This only serves to highlight the notion that threatening trade
sanctions may not be the best way to encourage environmental protection.
The JFTA is an important step forward in the continuing harmonization of
free trade and environmental protection policy. By including environmental
provisions in the text of trade agreements, the JFTA sets a new standard for
international trade negotiations. If the JFTA succeeds at improving both the
economic and environmental conditions in Jordan, without resulting in
challenges to United States domestic laws, then there can be no doubt on the
part of Washington politicians that balancing the two agendas is a difficult,
but not impossible, task. Further, there is likely no better place to initiate the
practice of including environmental provisions, which may or may not prove
to be trade obstructing, in trade agreements than the JFTA, which has only
minimal economic significance to the United States.
VII. CONCLUSION
By all indications, the JFTA implementation legislation, as well as
President Bush's Trade Promotion Authority, have made it through Congress
in the last four months because our country is at war. Indeed, from the very
beginning, this war has been hailed as a new kind of war, one that uses
nontraditional weapons, like asset freezing and sanctions against countries
that aid and abet the enemy. Officials in Washington are talking about peace
and economic reform in the same sentence.232
Unfortunately, the conflict between trade liberalization policies and
environmental protection still threatens to derail any progress that ratification
of the JFTA may have accomplished. It is too soon to tell what effect the
JFTA will have on environmental protection and trade relations between the
United States and Jordan. Hopefully, the cooperative spirit exhibited by
Congress during a time of crisis will not prove to be only a war-time
phenomenon. The greatest advances in international environmental
cooperation will only be achievable when we start with domestic
cooperation.
232 See Abrams, supra note 167; Stevenson, supra note 126.
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